Delays in wage negotiations do not necessarily mean work stoppage. Production can continue under the terms of the old contract while the parties are bargaining (holdout). This holdout option is included in a strategic bargaining game in addition to strike and lock-out threats. Integrating the bargaining model in a standard macroeconomic framework, it turns out that holdout threats will prevail under certain circumstances. In this case wages will be rigid in nominal terms, so that an increase in aggregate nominal demand increases aggregate output.
Introduction
Over the last decade, wage bargaining has got a more prominent place in macroeconomics. In part this is due to a recognition that in most industrialised countries, a large part of the workers have their wages set in collective bargaining. The change is also due to the recent advances in strategic bargaining theory [following Rubinstein (1982) ], which has provided more satisfactory tools to analyse wage negotiations. As yet, however, the bargaining process is treated fairly simplistically. Important institutional aspects of the bargaining situation are often neglected. In particular, it is usually assumed that a strike or a lock-out is an automatic consequence if there is no immediate agreement in the bargaining. This neglects the fact that if neither of the parties choose to initiate a work stoppage, production can continue under the terms of the old contract while the parties are bargaining [which I shall refer to as holdout, cf. Cramton and Tracy (1992) ].
Recently, there has however been some work explicitly allowing for holdouts. Cramton and Tracy (1992) set up an asymmetric information bargaining model to explain the occurence of strikes and holdouts. Fernandez and Glazer (1991) and Haller and Holden (1990) consider the effect of the holdout option in a Rubinstein bargaining model with complete information. MacLeod and Malcomson (1992) analyse whether incomplete contracts induce efficient investments, allowing for the possibility of holdout.
The present paper discusses some of the macroeconomic implications of the possibility of holdout. In particular, I show that the possibility of holdout may cause wages to be rigid in nominal terms, in the sense that the nominal wages of one contract period may affect the nominal wages of the following contract period. To do this, I set up a wage bargaining model where the type of dispute is endogenously determined. The wage bargaining model is integrated into a standard (imperfect competition) macroeconomic framework to emphasize that all 'non-standard' results follow from the modelling of the wage determination. It turns out that if nominal demand is high relative to the nominal wage of the old contract, the union will use strike threats to obtain a nominal wage increase. If nominal demand is low relative to the old nominal wage, the firm will use lock-out threats in order to press nominal wages down. For intermediate values of nominal demand relative to the old nominal wage, neither of the parties will threaten to initiate a work stoppage, and holdout threats will prevail. In this case nominal wages will remain constant.
The possibility of production under the old contract during the negotiations has important consequences for the effect of aggregate nominal demand. If aggregate nominal demand is increased when holdout threats are in use, nominal wages and prices will not be affected. Thus, the rise in nominal demand has a positive effect on output and employment. As demand and employment increase, so does the wage level that the unions can obtain by use of strike threats. If demand is sufficiently high, unions use strike threats rather than holdout threats, and nominal wages will be increasing in nominal demand. Thus, wages are only rigid within the interval where holdout threats are used.
The aim of the paper is to show how a common institutional feature of wage negotiations embedded in a standard macroeconomic model induces nominal rigidities. An interesting feature of the model is that it may explain bunching of contracts at zero nominal change, which appears to often be the case in periods of low inflation [Jacoby and Mitchell (1990) ]. The model is also consistent with a finding in Bhaskar (1988) that nominal inertia declines in periods of high inflation. Presumably, nominal rigidities have more than one cause, and no claim is made that the model gives the full explanation of nominal rigidities.
Section 2 below gives a short discussion of some of the institutional aspects of wage negotiations. Section 3 sets out the basic macroeconomic model, based on Weitzman (1985) . To sharpen the focus, demand functions are postulated directly. In section 4 the wage bargaining is modelled as a perfect information alternating offers model of the Rubinstein (1982) type. The type of dispute in the bargaining (strike, lock-out or holdout) is endogenously determined [Fernandez and Glazer (1991) and Haller and Holden (1990) ]. The equilibrium of the model is analysed in section 5. Some concluding remarks are given in section 6.
Some institutional aspects'
The crucial assumption in the model is that the wage of the old contract affects the threat points of the parties in the bargaining, even after the old contract period has expired [in labour law this is referred to as the 'after effect' of the contract, cf. Blanpain (1987) ]. To motivate this assumption, this section provides a very crude picture of the institutional setting of union wage negotiations in many Western European countries and the U.S.
In most European countries, union contracts are usually of finite duration. However, unless a work stoppage has been initiated, it is in most countries a well established practice that production continues under the terms of the old contract until a new agreement is reached, even after the old contract has expired. In many European countries, at least Austria, France, Norway, Spain and Sweden, the firm and the union are bound by the law to observe the old contract [cf. the country chapters in Blainpain (1987) ].* This does not imply that it is impossible for the employer to reduce nominal wages. To the extent that the remuneration consists of more 'flexible' parts, like bonus schemes, fringe benefits etc., the employer has some scope for reducing the remuneration even within the existing contracts. But for many workers the flexible part of the remuneration is small, which effectively limits the scope for wage reductions. Note also that in many countries workers rather quickly acquire a legal right also to additional payments. For instance, for Germany Blanpain (1987, pp. 71-72) writes '. . . the worker acquires a right if the employer grants the benefit several times without declaring a reservation'.
When it comes to reducing the fixed part of the wages, the employer has basically three possibilities. First, if the employer is in a sufficiently bad economic situation, threats of closing down parts or the whole plant would be credible, and the union might accept wage cuts in order to save jobs 'This section is based on Blanpain (1987 ), Evju (1984 . Gold (1989) , and private communications with S. Evju.
'Great Britain is an exception in the other direction as union contracts usually are not legally binding even within the contract period. [Cappeli (1985) and Carruth and Oswald (1987) ]. Secondly, in many countries employers are allowed to use lock-out as a means of forcing the union to accept wage reductions. Thirdly, the employers can unilaterally terminate the agreement, following specific legal procedures and after some time delay. But if the union contract is terminated, the terms of this contract are in many countries considered to be included in the individual employment contracts. Thus, even in this situation the employer cannot easily reduce the employees' money wages without the employees' consent. In general the employer would have to give the employees conditional notice, to be effective if the employees do not accept the wage reduction. If the employees do not accept the wage reduction, they are entitled to keep their old wage during the period of notice. Moreover, in many countries this type of conditional notice is only lawful if the wage reduction can be justified by the economic situation of the firm. Although the employers may in the end be able to unilaterally reduce money wages, the uncertainty of the outcome and the risk for a costly legal process may to some extent deter the employer from trying.3
In the U.S., the employer is bound by the law to observe the old union contract until a bargaining impasse is reached. As an impasse can be broken (for example the union reduces its wage demand), it might be difficult for the employer to unilaterally reduce wages [see Gold (1989, p. 36) ]. Individual workers have, however, less employment protection in the U.S. than in Europe.
Crampton and Tracy (1992) present data indicating that holdout is more frequent than strikes in the U.S., while Van Ours and Van de Wijngaert (1992) show that this also holds in The Netherlands. Furthermore, it is wellknown that unions often use other weapons than strikes, e.g. work-to-rule, go-slow, etc. [Blanpain (1987) -J, which may indicate that a holdout takes place. In Norway, there have been occasions where unions have refused to sign new wage contracts involving a reduction in money wages. When the employer has tried to reduce wages unilaterally, the union has taken the case to court and won, thus preventing the wage cut (Labour Court Decisions 17 January and 28 January, 1992).
The formal model below is set up with the aim of capturing the most 'As an illustration: Blanpain (1987, Vol. 2, p. 87 ) writes on Austria: 'An ex post facto reduction of the pay agreed in an individual agreement down to the level of the minimum wage specifted in a collective agreement by one-sided directive by the employer is not permissible. An agreement is required. If the employee refuses, the employer can, as otherwise in the case of nonacceptance of desired contract alterations, give conditional notice (notice of termination pending a change of contract). That means that he gives the employee notice to be eIfective in the event that he, the employee, does not agree to the intended wage reduction.
However, there is also protection from unwarranted dismissal with notice which is effective against this conditional notice'. important aspects as simply as possible. Thus, I assume that the employer's possibility of enforcing a cut in money wages lies in the lock-out threats, and neglect threats of closing down the plant and/or dismissing the workers. Presumably, all these threats will work in rather similar fashions.
The model
We consider a completely unionised economy consisting of K symmetric firms, each producing a different good. There is one union in each firm, each with L/K members, so that the total labour supply in the economy is L. The wage level is set at firm level in a bargain between union and firm. As each firm is small, a single lit-m will have only a negligible influence on the aggregate price and output level. Thus I assume that the firms regard the aggregate variables as exogenous. In the product market there is imperfect competition, so each firm sets the price of its product. All agents are assumed to have complete information. I also assume that the wage setting is simultaneous in all lirms, which shows that staggering is not necessary for the existence of normal rigidities.
The model has two contract periods, the previous and the present. The only role of the previous contract period is to provide a nominal wage that prevails during a holdout in the wage bargaining. The present contract period is assumed to be endless, to avoid taking into consideration the consequences of the wage bargaining for the following contract periods. [Holden (1988) analyses a multi-period version of a similar model, where these consequences are incorporated]. The present contract period has three stages.
Stage I. The government sets the total nominal money stock M>O. (Perhaps more realistically one could interpret M as an indicator for the total effect on aggregate nominal demand of the government's fiscal and monetary policy.) Stage 2. In each firm, union and firm (i.e. the management) bargain over the real wage to prevail.
Stage 3. Each firm sets price and employment level. There is market equilibrium (production equals sales). The assumption that the employment level is set unilaterally by the firm after the wage is set, is consistent with empirical findings for the U.S. and the U.K., cf. Oswald (1984) (and is probably fairly realistic for most other countries also).
Each firm i has a constant returns to scale production function Yi=Ni, where Yi is output and Ni is employment. The (present value of the) real profits of firm i over the contract period are
where Pi is the price of output, kVi is the wage level in firm i, and
PK) is some price index for the whole economy, assumed to be symmetric and homogeneous of degree one in the Pi's* The demand function facing each firm has a uniform constant elasticity4
where m = M/P is the real money stock. Let N =xiNi denote aggregate employment and W = W( W, , . . . , W,) be the aggregate nominal wage level (where W( ) is homogeneous of degree one), so that u =(t-N)/L is the aggregate unemployment rate, and w = W/P is the aggregate real wage. Furthermore, b is real unemployment benetits.5 The (present value of the) union's utility over the contract period is assumed to be a function of the real wage level Wi = Wi/P and the employment level of the firm:
where r=( 1 -u)w + ub is the average real income of all workers in the economy. (The chosen utility function simplifies the model, but more general utility functions could be used without altering the qualitative results).
As there is perfect foresight and the aggregate price level is exogenous to a single firm, it does not matter whether the parties contract over nominal or real wages: The parties have preferences over the real wage, so this is clearly what is of importance in the bargaining. However, a crucial assumption is that there is no indexation of money wages after the contract has expired (which is in accordance with Norwegian law). This ensures that the old contract only determines the nominal wage that prevails during a holdout, while the real wage during a holdout also depends on the aggregate price level.
An equilibrium in this model is a situation where, for a given M and a given distribution of old contracts, there is a Nash equilibrium in prices in stage 3, and where wages are given by a subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE) in the bargaining model in each firm in stage 2. To find an equilibrium, we start by analysing stage 3. The price of good i is given by the profit maximisation problem
4As in Weitzman (1985) . essentially the same demand function could be derived from a model where households maximise CES utility functions and where E is the elasticity of substitution among the goods.
'It is assumed that Otbc l-l/E, as l-l/E is the value of the average real wage in equilibrium.
As is well known, profit maximisation with constant elasticity of demand implies mark-up pricing, thus the price is given by the first-order condition
where v= l/( 1 -l/E)> 1. As profits are concave in Pi, the first-order condition of (4) is sufficient to ensure a unique maximum. These prices constitute a Nash equilibrium in the price setting game among the firms, since the maximum is irrespective of the prices set by the other firms.
The bargaining model
The. wage bargaining is conducted simultaneously in all firms, so in the analysis of the wage bargaining in a single firm, we can take the equilibrium values of the aggregate variables I, m and u as exogenous. During the bargaining, the parties will take into consideration the employment level of the firm depends on the real wage level; from (5) and (2) we obtain
We then obtain indirect payoff functions of the firm and union, this time as functions of m, r and Wi, by substituting out for (5) and (6) in (1) and (3):
We now proceed to the details of the bargaining game, which is a modified Rubinstein perfect-informatipn alternating-offers bargaining model. The players are assumed to make offers alternately, until an agreement is reached. Thus, there is no tinal period in the bargaining.6 This is the appropriate assumption when the players 'perceive that, after any rejection of an offer, there is room for a counterproposal' [Osborne and Rubinstein (1990, p. 54)]. The time between each offer is d, so 6 = e-* ' is the discount factor, and 0 the real interest rate. The focus will be on the limit case where the period length converges to zero, so that 6 converges to unity.
During the bargaining, unless one of the players makes an action to the contrary (initiating a strike or a lock-out), production continues under the terms of the old contract (holdout). The parties' payoffs during a holdout are assumed to be equal to their payoffs if they were to agree on a continuation of the old nominal contract, that is, the period payoffs during a holdout are (1-S)z(m, W-,/P) and (1-J)U(m,r,
where W-, is the nominal +%e bargaining periods should be thought of as short, and should not be confused with the contract period.
wage of the old contract, assumed to be the same in all firms. (In section 6 I consider the possibility that the firm reduces fringe benefits, etc., and the workers reduce etliciency during a holdout).
As is well-known, the outcome in alternating offer models (like noncooperative models in general) depends crucially on details in the specification of the game. Shaked (1987) shows how the consequences of introducing outside options depend on whether the seller is allowed to make a final offer before the buyer accepts the outside option (that is, leaves the seller). In the present setting it seems reasonable to assume that it takes less time to make an offer than to initiate a work stoppage. This suggests that before a player is able to initiate a work stoppage, the opponent should always be allowed to make a final offer (The managers may always shout an offer after the union leaders before they are able to leave the room).
Thus, I assume that the union can only initiate a strike when it has rejected an offer by the firm, and the firm can only initiate a lock-out when it has rejected an offer by the union. Once initiated, strikes and lock-outs are assumed to last until an agreement is made. [By using the results of Holden (1992) , it can be shown that the same results hold also under the weaker assumption that both players can commit to stop production for two periods, unless an agreement is made before that.] During a work stoppage, both players are assumed to obtain zero payoff.
An important point concerns the costs of a short work stoppage. I assume that the costs of a work stoppage are always non-negligible, even if an agreement is reached after one period (fixed costs). One type of fixed costs may be due to a time delay from the work stoppage is cancelled till normal production is resumed, perhaps because it takes time to restart the machines, etc. The lost output during this interval would correspond to the fixed costs in the model. Another sort of fixed costs is that the occurrence of a work stoppage may reduce the revenues the firm can obtain after production is resumed. This latter effect could arise because a work stoppage might have an adverse effect on the cooperation between union and firm, thus reducing productivity, or it may reduce demand because the work stoppage leads the customers of the firm to look for possible alternative suppliers. In all cases a work stoppage causes a reduction in the total possible payoff to the parties from reaching an agreement.
Thus, I assume that the payoff if an agreement is made after a work stoppage has occurred is yF z(m, wi) to the firm and yu U(m,r, Wi) to the union, where yrc 1 and y,,< 1. (This particular specification is chosen to simplify the algebra. The qualitative results are robust to other specifications, or if only one of the y's is strictly less than unity.)
Without loss of generality the firm is assumed to make the first offer in the beginning of period 1. If the union accepts this offer, the bargaining ends, if it rejects the union decides whether it will initiate a strike. If the firm's offer is rejected, the union makes a new offer in period 2. If the firm accepts this offer, the game ends. If the offer is rejected and no strike has been initiated, the firm decides whether it will initiate a lock-out. If the union's offer is rejected, it is the firm's turn to make an offer in period 3, and so on.
Observe first that if a work stoppage is initiated, then we have a standard Rubinstein game. There is an immediate agreement, and the unique SPE outcome [Rubinstein (1982) or Shaked and Sutton (1984) ] wF (w"), when the firm (union) makes the first offer is given by (i) ~~U(m,r,w~)=6y~U(m,r,w~)>O, The intuition in the first (second) equation is that the firm (union) will offer a payoff to the union (firm) which makes the union (firm) indifferent between accepting the offer or obtaining an agreement on its own offer in the next period, after one period of strike. Substituting out from (7) in (8) and rearranging, we obtain the unique pair (wF, w") that solves (8) wF=dFr, where dF=(l -6'1-2E)"'-E))/(l -a*)> 1, and (9) W'J,~iI(l-E)WF=~'Jr 3 where We then turn to the issue of how high wage the firm must offer so that the union will not strike. Define ws by V(m, r, w') = 6y, V(m, r, w"), (10) so that if the firm proposes ws in period 1, the union will be indifferent between accepting this proposal, and rejecting the proposal and then initiating a strike (as the latter alternative will end up in an agreement on w" in period 2). By using (7) and simplifying, (10) is equivalent to (Ws-r)(Ws)-s=8y"(W"-r)(W")+.
(lo') As shown in the appendix, (10') defines ws as a continuous and strictly increasing function of r, ws= w'(r), where wS(r) >r. It is also clear from (10') that for given r, ws is increasing in yv. The intuition here is that if the union rejects the first offer by the firm and strikes, then the fixed costs are incurred, and so is the value of reaching an agreement. As the value of reaching an agreement is reduced, the payoff that the union can obtain by striking will also go down. The firm may exploit this situation by offering a low wage in period 1, a wage that corresponds to the payoff the union would get if the fixed costs had been incurred. Define w'; analogously, by 44 4) = Gy,n(m, wF), or, substituting out from (7) and solving for wi,
wi = w?(r) =(6.J,?) 1,(1 -E)WL(gyF)l/(l -E'6Fr>r.
(11') Thus, if the union offers w\ in period 2, the firm is indifferent between accepting this offer and rejecting the offer and then initiating a lock-out. Turning now to period 1, define wL by U(m,r,wL)=(l--S)U(m,r,
W_,/P)+bU(m,r,w$). (12)
Thus, if the firm offers wL in period 1, the union is indifferent between accepting this offer and rejecting the offer and then obtaining an agreement on w$ in period 2, after one period of holdout. When the period length converges to zero, wL converges to wk, so that (11') and (12) define wL as a continuous and strictly increasing function of r, wL= wL(r), where wL(r)>r.
(11') and (12) show that wL is decreasing in yF. Thus, in this case it is the union that may exploit that unless the firm accepts the offer by the union in period 2, the fixed costs are incurred and the total value of reaching an agreement is reduced. Inspection of (IO') and (1 l'), shotis that wL(r)> wS(r), as wL > wF, w" > ws, and wF = w" when 6 converges to unity. Now consider the whole bargaining game, beginning in period 1. The union can ensure itself at least w '. If the firm offers less in period 1, the union is better off rejecting and initiating a strike. Correspondingly, the firm can ensure itself at least the payoff that corresponds to wL. If the union attempts to obtain more, the firm is better off rejecting the proposal of the union in period 2, and then initiating a lock-out. The SPE outcome depends on the value of W-,/P relative to ws and wL. We see that the type of dispute is determined by the size of the old contract, W-,/P, relative to wS(r) and wL(r). If W-,/P is lower than ws, then the union would benefit from using strike threats to obtain a nominal wage increase. Proposition 1 shows that strike threats are credible. Conversely, if W_ ,/P is higher than wL, then the firm would benefit from using lock-out threats to press nominal wages down. Proposition 1 shows that lock-out threats are credible. For intermediate values of W-,/P, neither of the parties will threaten to initiate a work stoppage, so holdout threats prevail, and money wages will remain unaltered.
Equilibrium
So far, we have considered the wage setting in a single firm. We now consider the whole economy. As firms are assumed to be symmetrical, Proposition 1 ensures that the same wage level will be set in all firms, which again implies that all firms set the same price. As prices are set as constant markups on wages in all firms by (5), it follows that the aggregate real wage is W/P= l/v.
In a symmetric equilibrium, we have that the average real income of all workers in the economy, r, is a strictly increasing function of the real money stock and the aggregate real wage [inserting 1 -u =(K/L) (M/P) in the definition of r]: (13) Moreover, in overall equilibrium the real wage implied by the price setting must be consistent with the wage bargaining. In the wage bargaining, there are three regimes (cf. Proposition 1) so that one out of three conditions must hold [using (13) The overall equilibrium now depends on the size of the nominal money stock relative to the old nominal wage. For low values of A4 (M-cM~=~~~W_~), WL<W_, so W= WL is the equilibrium wage. The intuition here is that when the nominal money stock is low relative to the old nominal wage, the price level will also be low and W-JP high. It follows from Proposition 1 that all firms use lock-out threats to press nominal wages down. For high values of M(M > MS= mSv W-t), Ws> W-t so W= Ws is the equilibrium wage. Here, the nominal money stock is high relative to the old nominal wage, so that the price level is also high and W-,/P low. From Proposition 1 we know that in this case all unions use strike threats to obtain a nominal wage increase. Detine NS= KmS and NL--KmL (where NS> NL) so NS and NL are the aggregate employment levels that applies when all firms set the same price level and the real money stock is equal to ms and mL, respectively. The observations above lead to Proposition 2. In this model the aggregate real wage is determined in the price setting, no matter which threats are effective in the wage bargaining. However, this does not imply that it is irrelevant which threats are in use in the wage determination, from the point of view of a single union or firm. Consider for instance the case where W-,/P is low so that unions use strike threats to obtain a nominal wage increase. If a single union instead used holdout threats, it would obtain a constant nominal wage, thus a lower real wage than the other unions.
Proposition 2 can be seen in light of the relationship between inflation and employment. Variation in the nominal money stock within the interval [ML, MS] leaves the nominal wage constant, and employment varies between NL and NS. However, if the nominal money stock is increased above MS, (W-W_1)MI., - nominal wages will increase proportionately and employment is constant at NS. Conversely, if the nominal money stock is reduced below ML, nominal wages will decrease proportionately, employment being at NL. The implied relationship between wage inflation and employment is thus as if the Phillips curve consists of two vertical parts, one with high employment and positive wage inflation, the other with low employment and negative wage inflation ( fig. 3 ). There will also be a horizontal part, with zero wage inflation and employment in the interval [NL, N'].
Concluding remarks
A work stoppage is not an automatic consequence of a delay in reaching an agreement in wage negotiations. If neither of the parties choose to initiate a work stoppage, production continues under the terms of the old contract during the wage negotiations (holdout). This aspect is incorporated in a simple macroeconomic model, yielding the following basic features. If aggregate nominal demand (the nominal money stock) is high relative to the nominal wage of the old contract, the union uses strike threats to obtain a nominal wage increase. If nominal demand is low relative to the nominal wage of the old contract, the firm uses lock-out threats to press nominal wages down. For intermediate values of aggregate nominal demand relative to the old nominal wage, holdout threats prevail and nominal wages remain constant.
When holdout threats are in use, an increase in aggregate nominal demand has no effect on wages and prices, thus it leads to a rise in aggregate employment. The implied relationship between wage inflation and employment is striking: The Phillips-curve consists of two vertical parts, one with high employment and positive inflation, the other with low employment and negative inflation. (At the positive inflation segment unions use strike threats to raise money wages, at the negative inflation segment firms use lock-out threats to reduce money wages).
The argument is developed within a union framework, with firm-level wage bargaining. However, it is my belief that it is of more general relevance. The firms in the present model could also be thought of as industries consisting of a given number of firms, and where the industry wage is set in a bargaining between the industry union and the employers' association in the industry. Thus, the main results apply also in a country with industry level wage bargaining. Furthermore, in many European countries there are also similar rules that limit the possibility firms have of unilaterally reducing the wages of individual workers in the non-union sector. As explained in section 2 above, the employer has to give the employees conditional notice, to be effective if the employees do not accept the wage reduction. It the employees do not accept the wage reduction, they are entitled to keep their old wage during the period of notice. Although strikes and lock-outs are of little relevance in the wage setting of individual workers, other types of threats could be used (like withdrawal of cooperation) with similar effects.
The assumption that the nominal wage is unaltered until a new agreement is reached is crucial for the results of the paper. This assumption is in accordance with law and established practice in many modern economies. But why do such laws or established practice exist? The main justification behind the law is the desire to protect the worker, who is often the weaker part of an employment relationship. If the employer is allowed to unilaterally reduce the nominal wage, employment protection laws would have less meaning, as the employer could reduce wages so much that the employees quit voluntarily (in countries with minimum wages given by law this would be the lower bound for the wage). Moreover, MacLeod and Malcomson (1992) show that under certain conditions the holdout possibility is essential to induce efficient investments.
The present paper emphasises the legal importance of the old contract. In addition, the old contract may influence wage bargaining if workers think that money wage reductions are unfair. Blinder and Choi (1990) report that many managers find real wage cuts less acceptable if they take place through cuts in money wages than if they come via an increase in prices. The legal and fairness arguments are complementary in the sense that fairness considerations may help explaining why the old contract has some legal protection. Furthermore, the fact that the old contract has some legal protection probably strengthens the feeling that money wage reductions are unfair.
The existence of fixed costs of a work stoppage plays a crucial role in the present model. However, there are also other reasons than fixed costs for why a lock-out is (ceteris paribus) more beneficial for the union than a strike is. During a strike, the union incurs the costs of enforcing the strikes (pickets). Furthermore, the risk for the workers of being replaced is usually much greater during a strike than during a lock-out, especially in the U.S. [Blanpain (1987) ]. Such aspects could easily be incorporated in the present model, by assuming that the payoff of the union during a lock-out is greater than the payoff during a strike, which would ensure that w'> ws even if yF =y" = 1. Thus, all the main results of the paper are unaffected, even if there were no fixed costs of a work stoppage.
In the model, I have assumed that the payoffs during a holdout are as if the old nominal contract were prolonged. However, a contract will rarely be so specific that it covers all aspects that determine the payoffs of the parties. Usually, there will be some scope for the parties to inflict a cost at the opponent while still observing the contract (or at least not undertake any verifiable violations of the contract). For example, the workers may follow the working rules meticulously in order to reduce profits (work-to-rule). Generally, it is much easier to contract on pay than on workers' effort, which leaves the union with much more scope for inflicting a cost on the firm than vice versa, when both parties still observe the old contract. On the other hand, the firm may within certain limits reduce bonus payments, fringe benefits, etc. Yet, on balance one would expect that in most cases the holdout payoffs are asymmetric in the sense that a holdout in the bargaining is more costly to the firm than to the union [this is the common assumption, see Moene (1988) , Cramton and Tracy (1992) and Holden (1988 Holden ( , 1989 ].
The basic features of the model would remain unaffected by this asymmetry in the bargaining, but for one striking difference. If a holdout is more costly to the firm than to the union, then it is easy to show that holdout threats will lead to a rise in nominal wages. Thus, the horizontal part of the 'Phillips curve' in fig. 3 will now be associated with a strictly positive rate of inflation. This implies that zero wage inflation can only be obtained if employment is low (equal to N'), so that lock-out threats are used to prevent demands for wage rises. Thus, in this case it is not possible to have both a high employment level and zero wage inflation.
The numerator is clearly positive as w" > ws, while the denominator being positive is equivalent to wS<rE/(E-1). To see that this latter inequality holds, observe that: (a) w'<w". (b) When the period length approaches zero, 6 approaches unity, and using L'Hbpital's rule, w" approaches r( 1 -2E)/(2 -2E). As (1 -2E)/(2 -24 < E/(E -l), it follows that w" < rE/( E -1).
Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 1
In all cases, the firm will propose the equilibrium outcome in its first offer, and this will be accepted by the union. However, to find the equilibrium outcome, we need to analyse what would happen if there is no immediate agreement.
We first consider the case where ws> W-,/P. In the main text, we observed that if a strike is initiated, then there will an immediate agreement on wF (w") if the firm (union) makes the first offer. I now show that ws is indeed the unique SPE outcome in the complete bargaining game when ws> W-,/P. The equilibrium strategies are, as long as no strike has been initiated (as soon as a strike is initiated, there is a switch to the usual Rubinstein-strategies):
Union: In odd periods: Accept any w 2 ws; reject w < ws and initiate a strike. In even periods: Propose w", given by rr(m, w") =( 1 -&r(m, W_ 1/P) + 67r(m, w").
Firm:
In odd periods; Propose w '. In even periods: Accept iff wl w". Do not initiate lock-out.
First consider the strategy of the firm. If the firm offers w > ws, it will be accepted and the firm loses from this. If it offers WC ws, there will be an immediate strike, and the firm will lose from this also. If the firm rejects an offer, there will be one period of holdout, and an agreement on ws in the next period. The firm will accept a wage level which gives the same payoff as a rejection will, thus it accepts any ws w" where w" is given by rr(m, w")= (1 -6)?r(m, W-l/P) +6n(m, wS).
Then consider the strategy of the union. If the union rejects an offer and strikes, there will be an agreement on w IJ in the following period, resulting in the payoff yuS V(m,r, w")= V(m,r, w'). If it rejects without striking, it will obtain one period of holdout and then an agreement on w" in the following period, which yields a lower payoff as W-,/P< ws. Thus the union will reject WC ws and strike. The union will clearly accept any wl ws, as it can never obtain a higher payoff. It does not matter what the union proposes in even periods, as long as it is at least w" (a lower offer would just be accepted, causing a loss to the union).
To see that ws is the unique outcome, assume that there exists a SPE with an outcome w# ws. Then the party that comes worse out than in the SPE with ws will deviate by following the strategies specified above, and the SPE w # ws unravels.
The case where wL< W-JP corresponds directly to the case where ws > W_ ,/P, so only the equilibrium strategies will be provided (as soon as a lock-out is initiated, there is a switch to the Rubinstein-strategies):
Union: Odd periods: Accept iff wl wL. Do not strike. Even periods: Propose wt. Firm: Odd periods: Propose wL. Even periods: Accept w 2 w$; reject w > wk and initiate lock-out.
Finally, we turn to the case where W_ JPE [w', w'+] . In this case neither of the players will initiate a work stoppage, as this would lead to an immediate agreement on wF or w", which gives both players a lower payoff than prolonging the agreement. Thus, holdouts threats prevail, and the unique SPE is w* = W-,,JP. 
